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THE MYTH OF THE WIN-WIN: MISDIAGNOSIS
IN TE BUSINESS OF REASSEMBLING NATURE
William H. Rodgers, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article starts with a closer than customary look at the most serious
obstacle to the ambitious campaign of environmental restoration that is the focus
of this Symposium. That obstacle is the human brain. The Article contends that
human cognitive processes are marvelous designers of serviceable self-deceptions.
In the war on nature that we witnessed in the twentieth century the most functional
of these is the firm belief in a non-zero sum world. This is the conviction that
gains from economic development could be enjoyed without sacrifice of the
natural world. This is a convenient, powerful, and serviceable myth although it
happens to be faulty at its foundations.
The happy assumptions of win-win are contradicted wherever we look.
This conference is focusing on the multi-faceted movement to restore-that is, to
fix, repair, set right-that which went wrong. The environmental restoration
movement thus rests on denial and repudiation of the win-win myth that allowed
our predecessors to claim progress without a price. Predictably, though, the zero-
sum mentality that allowed us to tear out the fabric of nature while retaining its
shell is still in vogue. There is an overwhelming desire to retain the benefits of
development while we repair the damage. The appealing beacon of the win-win
remains tantalizingly attractive to the present generation.
Self-deception, by definition, is misdiagnosis. And misdiagnosis, by
definition, is not where we should start in our campaigns to restore nature. The
principal institutions we rely upon to resist misdiagnosis are law and science. This
Article evaluates the performance of law and science in the field now loosely
called environmental restoration. My examples are drawn mostly from the
Columbia River, which is in the throes of an intense campaign to save populations
of the great salmon.
* Stimson-Bullitt Professor of Environmental Law, University of Washington.
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Neither law nor science has done well in these environmental restoration
circles. Law's problem, this Article contends, is that it is dependent on other
entities for the development of facts. Courts have responded by inventing a
"deference" doctrine that allows them to withdraw from the fray at the first hint of
conflicting scientific opinion. The problem of science, the Article argues, is that it
is confined to attempts to answer questions put forth by somebody else-
frequently the wrong.questions. Scientists have responded to law's encroachments
the same way courts have responded to the encroachments of science: adopting a
policy of complete deference. No question is too absurd to attempt to answer if it
has been asked by a responsible political entity.
It is a tall task to prescribe a fix for courts that defer too readily to science
and for science that defers too readily to law. But the recommendation here is for
courts to recommit themselves to the task of aggressive judging and for scientists
to recommit themselves to pursuing the right questions.
II. THE BRAIN'S PROBLEM: SELF-DECEPTION
"[Hiding the truth from the conscious mind
the better to hide it from others .... ,I
The claim that humans are disposed to misperceive reality is counter-
intuitive to say the least. Virtually all theories of human behavior rest upon some
calculus of self-interest that presumes an ability to discern what is in one's interest.
It is hard to imagine a louse or a mouse making much of its life if it was seriously
disposed to misread the intentions of predators that constrained its options.
Why are humans different? The evolutionary biologist, Robert Trivers,
develops his theory of self-deception in three steps. Step one is to recognize that
self-deception can be enormously valuable to an individual in the service of
deception.2 People hide the truth from their conscious minds to better hide it from
others. This theory insists that deception is an important aspect of communication,
especially among species with long memories and elaborate signaling. Convincing
oneself of a falsehood is a useful way to sell the story to others.
Superior deceivers master this art of self-deception. They overcome the
tell-tale signs of sweaty palms and shifty eyes by the simple expedient of
convincing themselves of the plausibility of their self-serving fictions.
Thus, the "hallmark of self-deception in the service of deceit," according
to Trivers, "is the denial of deception, the unconscious running of selfish and
deceitful ploys..., the creation of self-serving social theories and biased internal
narratives of on-going behavior which hide true intention.... The general cost of
ROBERT TRIvERs, SoCIAL EVOLUTION 415 (1985).
See id. at 395-420 (discussing deceit and self-deception).
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self-deception then is misapprehension of reality, especially social, and an
inefficient, fragmented mental system."3
To substantiate the link to our present topic of environmental restoration,
note that self-deception can thrive in environments of high uncertainty, complex
interaction, low empirical feedback, and obscure second and third level adaptive
responses. These characteristics are familiar domain to students of environmental
degradation who stress cumulative effects, constant change, and sudden surprise.4
And these characteristics are the essence of all strategies of environmental
restoration that presume that interventions A and B will yield process changes C
and D along with adaptive responses E and F that allow us to aspire to different
endpoints G and H that are conceded to be temporary in any event. This sort of
ecological theory, like a social theory, Trivers warns, "inevitably embraces a
complex array of facts and these may be very partially remembered and very
poorly organized.... Contradictions may be far afield and difficult to detect."' In
other words, in these arenas of deep mystery, self-deception may be expected to
thrive.
Step two in Trivers' theory of self-deception is to recognize that
misapprehension of reality serves. not only a negative function of deceit but also a
positive function of optimism.6 As elaborated by Trivers, in the last twenty years
an important literature has grown up that "appears to demonstrate that there are
intrinsic benefits to having a higher perceived ability to affect an outcome, a
higher self-perception, and a more optimistic view of the future than facts would
seem to justify."7 This mild form of self-inflation produces benefits for those who
practice it. Trivers explains, "[l]ife is intrinsically future-oriented and mental
operations which keep a positive future orientation at the forefront result in better
future outcomes (though perhaps not as good as those projected)."8 Environmental
lawyers would rush to confirm this speculation. Unwarranted optimism has
triumphed in many corridors where careful calculators fear to tread.
Environmental scientists would second the notion. The Corps of Engineers did not
secure its reputation by calling itself a "Cannot Do" organization.
The third step in Trivers' theory of self-deception reveals the theory's
relevance to modem environmental disputes. He adds the component of the
modem bureaucratic state and shows how truth can become the first casualty in the
multiple individual moves that add up to organizational behavior. Trivers'
3. Robert Trivers, The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception, 907
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIENCES (forthcoming April 2000).
4. See generally, e.g., BARRIERS & BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS
AND INSTITUTIONS (Lance H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995); NANCY LORD, DARKENED
WATERS: A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATED WITH THE
EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL AND CLEANUP (1992).






example is drawn from Richard Feymnan's analysis of NASA's Challenger
disaster where the muting of safety concerns developed from the agency's broader
aims to promote the space shuttle.9 According to Trivers, NASA "chose to
minimize the problem and the unit within NASA that was consigned to deal with
safety became an agent of rationalization and denial, instead of rational study of
safety factors.'. "Note, however," Trivers adds, "that it is the astronauts who
suffered the ultimate cost, while the upper echelons of NASA-indeed, the entire
organization minus the dead-may have enjoyed a net benefit (in employment for
example) from their casual and self-deceived approach to safety.""
The suggestion that organizational collectives can slip into gross patterns
of self-deception strikes a convincing note. There is a large selection of literature
on the topic that includes my personal favorite entitled Extraordinary Popular
Delusions and the Madness of Crowds."2 Today, few environmental lawyers pass
up an opportunity to elaborate upon the folly, foolishness, or self-deception that
befall bureaucracies known to them. They do not deny the phenomenon. They
embrace it, extend it, and embellish it.
The grand self-deception that contributed mightily to the steady demise
of the Columbia River salmon was the serviceable belief that the hydropower
dams could be made compatible with the salmon's survival needs. The Bonneville
Dam was constructed in the lower river (River Mile 146) between 1934 and 1937.
It was designed with adult fish ladders that proved serviceable beyond
expectations. 3 That some adult salmon made successful use of the fish ladders was
taken as a harbinger of salmon-hydro coexistence. This "proof' that dams were
compatible with fish buoyed later decisions to construct more dams. In 1945,
Congress gave voice to this win-win philosophy with a declaration that the
McMary Dam be constructed with full protection of the anadromous fish runs. 14
Last to be built under this win-win philosophy were the four lower Snake River
dams (the Snake joins with the Columbia at Pasco, Washington) that were
completed in the 1970s. These facilities are now the focus of one of the most
intense dam-removal debates in the United States. 5 These dams with completion
9. See id. See also RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, "WHAT Do YOU CARE WHAT OTHER
PEOPLE THINK?" FURTHER ADVENTURES OF A CURIOUS CHARACTER 113-237 (1988).
10. Trivers, supra note 3.
11. Id.
12. CHARLES MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS
OF CROWDS (Harmony Books 1980) (1841).
13. See LISA MIGHETrO & WESLEY J. EBEL, SAVING THE SALMON: A HISTORY OF
THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS' EFFORTS TO PROTECT ANADROMOUS FISH ON THE
COLUMBIA AND SNAKE RIVERS 53-54 (1994). See also generally JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON
WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON CRISIS (1999).
14. River and Harbor Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-114, ch. 19, § 2, 59 Stat. 10,
22, quoted in THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 116 (Joseph
Cone & Sandy Ridlington eds., 1996).
15. For discussion on removal of the four lower Snake dams, see the full-page
ad of the Living Rivers Campaign, 'Time line to Extinction: If we don't act, Snake River
300 [Vol. 42:297
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dates are Ice Harbor (1961), Little Goose (1970), Lower Monumental (1969), and
Lower Granite (1975).
Of course, it is impossible to say definitively how widely disseminated
the win-win myth of dams and salmon was. It was most popular among the
construction and power agencies16 that were promoters of the projects. It was quite
serviceable among political supporters. The win-win certainty was not embraced
by the fisheries agencies. Albert M. Day, Director of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service made the clearest objection to the "cumulative" losses that would attend
construction of the four dams on the lower Snake:
If these [salmon] survivors are then confronted with a series of four
dams in the Snake there is the strongest doubt that these added
obstacles can be overcome. There is virtual assurance that only a
fraction of existing runs could be gotten to the spawning grounds in
the Snake River system, and that the progeny of this fraction would
suffer further loss in its return movement to the sea. This situation
raises the unavoidable question as to whether we should recommend
the development in the Snake.
17
Some would say "we chose dams over salmon" in the political decisions
approving the lower Snake dams. Others would say "we chose dams and salmon
in the decisions, but subsequent events proved us wrong." But with self-deception
there are always two voices. The facts were that the dams would come at the price
of salmon. But political decisionmakers preferred to believe that they could have
dams and salmon.
To illustrate further the varying rates at which scientific "truth" can work
its way into political collectives, I will use the concrete example of the following
scientific proposition: There is a fifteen percent loss of juvenile salmon in
downstream passage at the Bonneville Dam. This is a devastatingly depressing bit
of scientific datum. A fifteen percent loss at each dam is a harbinger of extinction.
With a number of refinements and qualifiers, the figure would be accepted as
accurate in scientific circles today.' How quickly would it have been embraced by
Columbia River fishing constituencies? Almost certainly, the fishing Indians
would have accepted this number, or rejected it as an understatement, in 1937 and
salmon will disappear forever," N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1999, at A23. For background, see
generally KEITH C. PETERSEN & MARY E. REED, CONTROVERSY, CONFLICT, AND
COMPROMISE: HISTORY OF THE LOWER SNAKE RIVER DEvELOPMENT (1994).
16. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bonneville Power
Administration.
17. Memorandum from Albert M. Day, Director, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service
to the Department of the Interior's Coordination Committee, Dec. 23, 1946 (Record Group
No. 75, BIA, Box 1207, File Effects of the Upper Columbia and Snake River [Dams] on the
Indian Fisheries, National Archives, Pacific Northwest Region).
18. The downstream mortality figure commonly mentioned today is seven
percent per dam.
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1938, based on their personal observations immediately after closure of the dam.
19
This estimate would have become "truth" to the Columbia Basin Fisheries
Development Association, the commercial fishing people, no later than 1945 with
the noticeably dramatic declines in the commercial pack due to fall off in the
returning adults.20 This "truth" would have worked its way into acceptance within
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service by 1950 when the first full salmon-cycle studies
were completed to the satisfaction of scientists Barnaby and Holmes.2 This steady
flow of "truth," if we can continue the metaphor, eventually might have triumphed
in the collective conscience of the Corps of Engineers by 1980 when the
proposition was no longer deniable.22
What can we do about these obstacles of institutional self-deception and
pockets of cultural resistance to scientific findings? The only saviors nominated
are the legal and scientific institutions or some combination of the two. Let us start
with the law.
I. THE COURTS' PROBLEM: IGNORANCE
[Clourts are confined to a "highly restricted form of knowing.... "23
The enduring challenge of the courts in contributing to better decisions on
environmental restoration is that they must take their facts from somebody else.
Courts must decide what knowledge is legitimate and they must adhere to
processes for obtaining it. To evaluate the performance of the courts, I will start
with the question posed by the organizers of this Symposium: "How well does the
law integrate scientific findings into legal principles?" To elaborate further, I will
19. See generally INDIAN SERVICE, SURVEY OF INDIAN FISHERMEN (1937-38)
(surveying Indian fishermen as the dam was closed at Bonneville circa Dec. 1, 1937)
(Record Group No. 75, BIA, Box 125, File 115, Columbia River Fishing, 1938-50,
National Archives, Pacific Northwest Region).
20. See Statement by James H. Cellars, Executive Secretary, Commercial
Fishery Interests of the Columbia River, to the Northwest Governors Power Policy Meeting
5 app. B (Aug. 18, 1954) (stating that downstream losses may be "far higher" due to
experimental limitations)) (Box 702, File #2, Pacific Northwest Governors' Power Policy
Committee-1954 and 1955, National Archives, Pacific Northwest Region).
21. See FREDERICK A. DAVIDSON, AQUATIC BIOLOGIST, THE EFFECT OF
BONNEVILLE DAM ON THE SALMON POPULATIONS IN THE COLUMBIA RIVER 3 (circa 1953)
(Record Group No. 75, BIA, Box 128, File 115, Fishing Reports, Effects of Bonneville
Dam on Salmon in the Columbia River by F.A. Davidson, Aquatic Biologist, National
Archives, Pacific Northwest Region).
22. The 1980 date is chosen arbitrarily as the year of enactment of the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning & Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839-839h
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See MIGHETro & EBEL, supra note 13, at 129-33.
23. SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN
AMERICA 9 (1995). See generally D.H. Kaye, Proofin Law and Science, 32 JURIMETRICS J.
313 (1992).
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borrow from consensus descriptions of the role of courts in scientific disputes' to
ask whether courts have delivered on expectations that they resolve disputes, serve
the function of public education, pursue justice, and encourage vigorous and
effective adversary processes.
To test these postulations, I have explored a case sample of thirty-nine
decisions addressing fisheries conflicts on the Columbia River.' Have the courts
met these high expectations that we have for them? Have they worked to
overcome their ignorance? With rare exceptions, no. They have made ignorance a
virtue and have disclaimed responsibility by deferring to the administrative
agencies. Do these courts "integrate" scientific findings into law? Rarely. Their
tolerance is so broad that if there is a hint of scientific "conflict" before the
agencies,26 the courts readily surrender their decisonmaking powers.
Do courts resolve disputes? No. They extend them. Do they fulfill the
function of public education? They try. But how much educating can be done
when these judicial explanations are nine parts arcane technicalities? Do these
courts pursue justice? This goal figures so rarely in judicial decisionmaking that
courts are more likely to disclaim it than embrace it.27 Do they encourage vigorous
and effective adversary processes? No. My survey of the cases convinces me that a
cathartic and decisive trial on the merits is the exception not the rule.
On the Columbia, help for the salmon in the courts is thus thrice stunted.
Litigators try to push balky agencies into marginal change by asking rigid
formalists to pull procedural strings. All works by indirection. The fish can be
helped only through the crude tool of an agency. It is like trying to paddle with a
broom. The agency can be moved only with the fine threads of procedure. It is like
trying to pull a barge with a rope. The procedures will issue only if the judge is so
disposed. It is like trying to tempt a mule with a stone.
I have no solutions to this state of affairs. A generation of federal judges
has been selected for their docility. Advancement and honors are reserved for
those who show the greatest deference. Fortunately, there is a skeleton crew still
24. See generally STEVEN GOLDBERG, CULTURE CLASH: LAW AND SCIENCE IN
AMERICA (1994); JASANOEF, supra note 23.
25. A ten-page summary of this case law appears in Law Seminars International,
Materials on The Mighty Columbia: A River in Transition, Dec. 9-10, 1999, Seattle, Wa.
(Continuing Legal Education materials prepared by William H. Rodgers, Jr.) (on file with
the Author). See generally Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the
Endangered Species Act: Lessons from the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REv. 519 (1999).
26. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 9.3, at 851 (2d ed.
1994).
27. See American Rivers v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 109 F.3d 1484,
1492-93 (9th Cir. 1997), amended by 126 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 1997). The court applied
mootness and the 60-day notice requirement to agencies that had been on notice for 20
years and said "we lack authority to consider the equities." Id. This language does not
appear in the amended decision.
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on the job.28 Their work shows familiarity with the aggressive hard-look doctrine
of judicial review that is at the foundation of modem environmental law. There are
still some judges to be found who take seriously their duty to make science a part
of their mandate. They have not forgotten that courts are supposed to resolve
disputes, advance public understanding, and pursue justice.
IV. THE SCIENTISTS' PROBLEM: CONSTRAINT AND DIRECTION
"[The turbines] are absolutely incapable of hurting the fish. Ifyou could put a
mule through there, and keep him from drowning he would go through
without being hurt. "29
This somewhat quaint example is offered to illustrate that the questions
put to science are invariably constrained by legal and political choice. So far as I
know, the mule experiment proposed by Colonel Robins for the Columbia was
never conducted. Scientists used fish as the experimental animal rather than mules.
The fish did not fare nearly as well as the mules in the mind of Colonel Robins.
Though never answered by a decisive experiment, the issue of mule passage
through the turbines somehow has lost its urgency.
The problem of being assigned the wrong question has haunted scientists
who labor on the multiple fronts of environmental restoration. A number of years
ago Alvin Weinberg invented the term 'VIans-scientific" to describe questions that
could be asked of science but not answered.30 In Weinberg's schema, "trans-
scientific" questions were an oddity and a fluke. In today's world, "trans-
scientific" questions are a common product of the political process. Pursuing
unanswerable questions with a prolonged campaign of more study is a satisfactory
outcome for many defenders of the status quo.
31
Some lawyers are strongly interested in constraining scientific processes
that show promise of asking the embarrassing questions. They much prefer inquiry
into the safe questions. The entire apparatus of the National Research Council
serves to provide independent advice to the federal agencies.32 But veteran
observers know well that the choice of the chair and the shape of the questions and
28. For example, recent commendable decisions include Oregon Natural Desert
Ass'n v. Singleton, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1999) (Redden, J.), Pacific Coast Fed. of
Fishermen's Ass'n v. National Marine Fisheries Serv., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (W.D. Wash.
1999) (Rothstein, J.), Oregon Natural Resources Council Action v. United States Forest
Service, 59 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (W.D. Wash. 1999) (Dwyer, J.).
29. MIGHETTO & EBEL, supra note 13, at 71 (quoting a 1941 statement by
Thomas Robins, Assistant Chief of Engineers).
30. Alvin M. Weinberg, Science and Trans-Science, 10 MINERVA 209, 209
(1972).
31. See K. Norman Johnson, Science-Based Assessments of the Forests of the
Pacific Northwest, in CREATING A.FoRESTRY FOR THE 21sT CENTURY: THE SCIENCE OF
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 397 (Kathryn A. Kohm & Jerry F. Franklin eds., 1997).
32. See RODGERS, supra note 26, § 1.6, at 68-76.
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the membership of the committee is open to debate and subterranean influence.
There is something called a "good science" movement in many comers of
environmental law, but its political agenda is anything but "good science."'33 On
the Columbia, Senator Slade Gorton has championed the establishment of an
Independent Science Review Panel ("ISRP") to review the various fish restoration
projects. Critics claim the goal is not good science but superfluous review and
obstructionism.3
As we did with law, I will borrow from consensus descriptions of the
scientific process35 to evaluate the state of restoration science on the Columbia.
Expectations of this science are progress orientation, falsifiable/testable
conclusions, validation by normal processes, and conclusions subject to perpetual
revision.
Does the science of the river meet these expectations? Erratically, at best.
Progress on the most basic questions is grudging. After years of study, there is no
consensus on flow-survival relationships for salmonids. There is no consensus on
the efficacy of flow augmentation. There is no consensus on the use of artificially
propagated fish to augment wild populations.36
There is little incremental progress dictated by the use of falsifiable and
testable conclusions. Fads change-for example, the use of hatcheries for
production has fallen out of favor and woody debris is now left in streams rather
than removed from them. But classical hypothesis testing is not easily done in the
context of ecological modification. While "adaptive managemenf' is part of the
gospel of environmental restoration,37  actual experimentation (where
methodologies are put in competition) is only getting started.
Scientific approaches on the Columbia River are certainly subject to
validation by many different processes-ordinary and extraordinary. But the
33. Holly D. Doremus, Listing Decisions Under the Endangered Species Act:
Why Better Science Isn't Always Better Policy, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 1148 (1997);
Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REv.
1613, 1646 (1995).
34. See John M. Volkman, How Do You Learn from a River? Managing
Uncertainty in Species Conservation Policy, 74 WASH. L. REv. 719, 749-56 (1999)
(discussing the role of independent science).
35. See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 24; JASANOFF, supra note 23.
36. INDEPENDENT SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD, LOOKING FOR COMMON GROUND:
COMPARISON OF RECENT REPORTS PERTAINING TO SALMON RECOVERY IN THE COLUMBIA
RIVER BASIN (Feb. 1, 1999) (ISAB 99-3) (ISAB Work-in-Progress Report).
37. See, e.g., KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND
POLITICS FOR THE ENVIRoNMENT 51-86 (1993); Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Adaptive
Management: Learning from the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16
ENVTL. L. 431,441-60 (1986).
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classical ideas of the gradual overthrow of paradigms are not telling and
instructive.38
Interestingly, the scientific establishment has responded to its problem of
constraint the same way the legal establishment has responded to its problem of
ignorance-by deference to other authorities. Obedience to political and legal
instruction seems the best theory for explaining the quarter-century fixation on
barging of juvenile salmon39 as the scientific question of preeminence in the
Columbia River salmon debates. The solution also, as with the courts'
abandonment of deference, is some version of rediscovered skepticism. More
people should remember that environmental law gave birth to the "hard look"
doctrine that was the antithesis of deferential review.40 The National
Environmental Policy Act4' now gives all agencies explicit invitation to explore
alternatives beyond those that are politically defined, contrived, and preferred.42
And the internet offers a new weapon of transparency in ongoing debates over the
right questions to ask.43 This sudden and dramatic overthrow of bureaucratic
strategies of secrecy and control is a happening that should be celebrated. An open
book has magically appeared. There is now on the scene a great outpouring of
'works in progress,' 'provisional' and 'preliminary' drafts, documents that we are
not supposed to 'cite, quote, mention, or acknowledge.' This is institutional
thinking in progress. These open agency deliberations still contain the double
messages of self-deception. But contradictions are laid bare.
V. CONCLUSION
The myth of the win-win has done much to justify damage to nature, and
it has put the despoilers in the enviable position of the holders of the status quo.
The facility of the courts and the insights of science are indispensable allies to the
recovery of these lost opportunities. Courts must overcome their informational
limitations and scientists must resist their directional constraints. The strategies of
the hard look and the open look can help achieve these welcome independencies.
38. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCmENTiFIc REVOLUTIONS
(1962).
39. For a recent discussion about salmon barging on the Snake and Columbia
Rivers, see Sam Howe Verhovek, U.S. Giving Salmon a Lift, But Future ofAid is in Doubt,
N.Y. TIMES, May 6,2000, at Al.
40. RODGERS, supra note 26, § 1.8, at 90-95.
41. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321--4370d
(1994 & Supp. III 1997).
42. See RODGERS, supra note 26, §§ 9.1-9.8, at 801-963.
43. Northwest Fisheries Science Center, Cumulative Risk Initiative Home Page
(visited Dec. 10, 1999) <http:llwww.nwfsc.noaa.gov/cril>.
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